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INTRODUCTION
Refugees and internally displaced persons [“IDPs”] are hardly a
new phenomenon for Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein’s long and brutal
rule forced displacement was a deliberate state policy. 1 The
government used expulsions as a tool to subdue recalcitrant
populations and punish political opponents. The two main victims of
this displacement were the Kurds, Iraq’s largest minority group
which staged repeated rebellions, and the Shi’a majority, many of
whom opposed the regime, including hundreds of thousands of
Marsh Arabs. 2 The government also used expulsions to take over
fertile and oil-rich land. From the Kirkuk region, Saddam Hussein
uprooted more than 100,000 Kurds and also members of the smaller
Turkmen and Assyrian (Christian) minorities in an effort to
‘Arabize’ the area. In all, when the United States invaded in 2003
close to one million people were internally displaced in Iraq. 3
Another one to two million Iraqis lived abroad fearing persecution
should they return. In fact, Iraq was one of the largest refugeeproducing countries in the world prior to the U.S. entry on the
scene. 4
1. ROBERTA COHEN & JOHN FAWCETT, BROOKINGS INST., THE INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PEOPLE OF IRAQ (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/
2002/1120iraq_cohen.aspx (estimating that as a result of the displacement policy
more than one million people remain forcibly displaced in Iraq today).
2. Id.
3. See id. (breaking down the total number of displaced to include 600,000 to
800,000 in northern Iraq and 300,000 in southern and central Iraq); see also JOHN
FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER, BROOKINGS INST., THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PEOPLE OF IRAQ 1 (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/IDP/
articles/iraqreport.pdf (recognizing that little attention was paid to the displaced
despite substantial international humanitarian efforts).
4. See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2000 185
(Immigration and Refugee Services of America 2000) (ranking Iraq third on a list
of countries that have produced the greatest numbers of refugees and asylum
seekers, with 568,000 people formally qualifying for refugee or asylum status and
an estimated one to two million Iraqis living abroad with a well-founded fear of
persecution in Iraq); see also U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY 2002 170 (Immigration and Refugee Services of America 2002) (ranking
Iraq ninth on a list of countries that have produced the greatest numbers of
refugees and asylum seekers, with 300,000 people formally qualifying for refugee
or asylum status and an estimated one to two million Iraqis living abroad with a
well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq).

COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

1/22/2009 6:03:45 PM

IRAQ’S DISPLACED

303

The U.S. invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, far from
resolving the problem, however, made it worse. It catapulted the
country into a near civil war between Shi’a, who had largely been
excluded by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Sunnis who until then
had dominated the government. 5 The combination of intense and
bloody sectarian violence, coalition military action, fighting among
Shi’a militias and between the government and the Mahdi army, and
generalized violence and criminality caused massive uprooting. In
2007, some 60,000 Iraqis were reported to be fleeing their homes
each month. 6 New displacement diminished sharply in 2008 as
overall security improved in Iraq. 7 But together with those who had
been displaced earlier, some fifteen to twenty percent of the Iraqi
population—or 4.7 million people out of a total population of 27
million—remained displaced. Of this total, 2.7 million (ten percent
of Iraq’s population) are inside the country while some 2 million
more are abroad, mostly in neighboring countries. 8
5. See, e.g., Michael Howard, Iraq Slips Toward Civil War After Attack on
Shi’a Shrine, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2006/feb/23/iraq.iraqtimeline1/print (recognizing the near civil war
that resulted from retaliatory attacks by Sunni and Shi’a Muslims on holy sites
following the changing power dynamics caused by the U.S. invasion).
6. Andrew Harper, Where to Now? Decreasing Options for Displaced Iraqis,
MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, Sept. 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.
org/Feature/display.cfm?id=644 (noting Iraqi Red Crescent Organization estimates
that the monthly displacement figure is actually closer to 100,000).
7. See IDP WORKING GROUP, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ:
UPDATE, Mar. 24 2008, www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDoc
UnidFilename/SHIG-7D6DBL-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (recognizing
that the rate of displacement has been significantly lower in 2008 but secondary
displacement, particularly in Baghdad, has increased).
8. See IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, IOM BI-WEEKLY REPORT
(International Organization For Migration, Geneva, Switzerland), Mar. 15, 2008, at
1, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDoc
UnidFilename/LSGZ-7J4BDV-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (estimating the
number of displaced within Iraq since February 2006 as 1,596,448 and the number
earlier displaced within Iraq as 1,212,108, a total of 2.8 million internally
displaced); see also Statistics on Displaced Iraqis Around the World, U. N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl= SUBSITES&id=470387fc2 (last visited Sept.
16, 2008) (estimating 500,000-700,000 refugees in Jordan, and 1.4 million in
Syria); Kenneth H. Bacon & Kristele Younes, Op-Ed, Outside and Inside Iraq’s
Border, a Forgotten Exodus, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2008 (setting forth the number
of refugees in the Gulf States, including 130,000 in Egypt, 50,000 in Lebanon, and
57,000 in Iran); Iraqi Refugees: Can the U.S. Do More to Help?: Written
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Today’s displaced Iraqis are not viewed as sympathetically around
the world as those persecuted and uprooted by Saddam Hussein. 9
One reason is that they are seen as a problem largely of the United
States’ making and one that the United States should therefore “fix.”
America’s failure to establish security in the country after its
invasion or to prepare effectively for the country’s reconstruction is
considered a major reason for the chaos and violence that caused the
mass displacement. As a result, many donor governments have been
reluctant to fully share the burden of Iraq’s displaced, believing the
United States should foot most of the bill together with the
government of Iraq, which over the past year has been able to
accumulate considerable oil wealth. Nor have they been overly
forthcoming in resettling Iraqi refugees or in offering funds to the
governments of Jordan and Syria, which house most of the
refugees. 10

Statement Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Subcomm. on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Middle East
and South Asia, 110th Cong. (2008) (written statement of L. Craig Johnstone,
Deputy High Commissioner, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees),
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/joh022608.htm (stating that the
level of displacement has stabilized and the overall rate of displacement has
decreased). But see FAFO, IRAQIS IN JORDAN 2007: THEIR NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 3, http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/jordan/IJ.pdf (concluding,
despite contrary reports, that only 450,000-500,000 Iraqis have fled to Jordan,
perhaps indicating that the governments concerned have provided inflated figures
to the international community).
9. See No-Fly Zones: The Legal Position, BBC NEWS, Feb. 19, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008)
(pointing out that the United States and its allies, for example, set up a no fly zone
at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to protect displaced Kurds from Saddam
Hussein’s wrath); see also GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Pacific Haven Wraps up
Humanitarian
Efforts,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pacific_
haven.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (describing a military operation in 1996-97
during which the U.S. rescued approximately 6,500 Kurds from northern Iraq).
10. But see KELLY O’DONNELL & KATHLEEN NEWLAND, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., THE IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS: THE NEED FOR ACTION 22 (2008), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-The_Iraqi_Refugee_Crisis_The_Need_
for_Action_011808.pdf (demonstrating that Sweden has been an exception, and
anticipates taking in more than 25,000 refugees in 2006-2007, significantly more
than its EU counterparts). See also id. (noting that from 2006-June 2007, Greece,
the Netherlands, Germany and the UK took in more refugees than the United
States, with numbers reaching 4,900; 3,327; 2,882; and 1,970 respectively as
compared to 910 for the United States).
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The Iraqi government’s attitude toward its displaced population
has contributed to this international unwillingness to extend needed
support. Even though Iraq’s budget surplus from oil revenues is
projected to be $79 billion by the end of 2008, the Shi’a-dominated
government of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has delivered only minimal
amounts of funding to neighboring states for the refugees. 11 Some
believe it is because many of the refugees are Sunni and Christian or
because the refugees humiliated the government by departing. Still
others argue that support for the refugees will discourage their
returning home. Nor has the government been forthcoming with
support for its internally displaced population, again dampening
other countries’ willingness to contribute.
The U.S. government’s fear of terrorism after September 11 has
also cast a shadow of suspicion over Iraq’s displaced. Alarm bells are
constantly raised that some Iraqi refugees could be associated with
terror cells, and others could become potential terrorists if they
remain displaced for long periods without assistance. 12 Although the
U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) has identified
up to 100,000 vulnerable Iraqis for resettlement, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) has subjected them to such intense
screening that resettlement has been excruciatingly slow and the
number admitted small—some 12,000 who fled since 2003, with

11. See Walter Pincus, Iraq’s Slow Refugee Funding has Ripple Effect; U.N.
Says It May Scale Back Its Effort; Some Nations Have Withheld Payments, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2008, at A12 (underscoring that many donor countries have
withheld funding for refugees as a result of the Iraqi government’s meager efforts,
providing only fifteen million dollars to Syria, two million dollars to Lebanon, and
eight million dollars to Jordan); James Glanz & Campbell Robertson, As Iraq
Surplus Rises, Little Goes Into Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A1
(describing the expected windfall to the Iraqi government resulting from increased
oil prices).
12. See DANIEL L. BYMAN & KENNETH M. POLLACK, BROOKINGS INST.,
ANALYSIS PAPER NO 11: THINGS FALL APART: CONTAINING THE SPILLOVER FROM
AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR 5 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Files/rc/papers/2007/01iraq_byman.pdf (recognizing that refugee camps are often
breeding grounds for militia groups, regardless of whether they are under
international control); see also Interview with Amelia Templeton, Refugee Policy
Analyst, Human Rights First, by e-mail (Mar. 3, 2008) (explaining that the
Department of Homeland Security has expressed the fear that “terrorists will seek
to infiltrate” the resettlement program if procedures are weakened and large
numbers are put in the pipeline).

COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC

306

1/22/2009 6:03:45 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:301

most admitted in 2008. 13 The extensive delay even prompted the
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to complain to Washington about the failure
to expedite resettlement for the Iraqis who are at risk because they
worked for the U.S. government. 14 By contrast, the victims of
Saddam Hussein have fared much better in gaining admission to the
United States; in the past, roughly 37,000 Iraqi refugees fleeing that
regime resettled in the United States. 15
Neighboring states, which to their credit have taken in up to two
million Iraqis, also share fears that the refugees could bring their
home grown ethnic and religious struggles to their countries of
asylum. In November 2005, three Iraqi nationals recruited by alQaeda entered Jordan and blew themselves up at Amman hotels
killing sixty people. 16 Although this violent incident did not involve
the “refugees” per se, Jordan subsequently began barring entry of
Iraqi men from the ages of eighteen to thirty-five, and there have
been repeated warnings that large numbers of Iraqi refugees could
represent a security threat to the region. 17 Some argue that displaced

13. Walter Pincus, U.S. to Admit 17,000 Iraqi Exiles, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
2008, at A12.
14. See Spencer S. Hsu & Robin Wright, Crocker Blasts Refugee Process,
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2007, at A1 (noting that “thousands of desperate Iraqis who
have worked alongside Americans now find themselves the targets of insurgents
and sectarian militias”). In FY 2007, the United States issued special immigrant
visas for translators and interpreters to 429 Iraqi principal applicants plus their
family members, and in FY 2008 issued visas to 318 principal applicants plus their
family members as of April. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the
Spokesman, U.S. Humanitarian Assistance for Refugees and Internally Displaced
Iraqis (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/apr/103623.htm
[hereinafter Dep’t of State Fact Sheet] (announcing further that new legislation
would increase the number of visas available to Iraqis in immediate danger to
5,000 but that processing procedures for such visas remained unfinished).
15. Lawrence E. Bartlett, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration, Statement at Georgetown University Panel Discussion on Iraq: The
Human Cost of War (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Bartlett Statement] (claiming an
upcoming expansion of the U.S. resettlement program to make up for the disparity
between the Iraqis admitted from the mid-1970s through 2003, roughly 37,000,
and from 2003-2007, 692).
16. Nir Rosen, Iraq’s Jordanian Jihadis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006
(magazine), at 54 (noting that non-Jordanians were used in the attack to avoid
infiltration by Jordanian intelligence authorities).
17. Thanassis Cambanis, Exodus from Iraq Unsettles Mideast, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2006, at A1 (describing the results of Jordan’s change of policy, in
particular the roundup and subsequent deportation of Iraqi men).
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men and women, desperate for funds, could easily fall prey to
militant groups. In fact, the Iraqi refugee situation is often compared
to the worst refugee case studies (e.g., Afghanistan) in which
refugees paid and armed by third parties undertook jihad against
their countries. 18
The Palestinian refugee problem has further affected how Iraqi
refugees are viewed and at times has undermined a willingness to
help the them. For sixty years, Arab countries have borne the brunt
of the Palestinian refugee crisis and are therefore mindful of the
consequences of accepting large numbers of refugees for long
periods. One Middle East specialist, when speaking of Jordan,
commented that “[a]dding another large refugee population could
seriously undermine the viability of a key U.S. ally in the Middle
East.” 19 Although both Jordan and Syria have been widely
commended for admitting large numbers of Iraqis, Jordan began to
restrict entry at the end of 2006 and Syria began to restrict entry in
the fall of 2007. 20 It is feared that the two governments could in time
deport the refugees back to Iraq or make life so untenable for them
that they will have no choice but to return. By now, eight to twelve
percent of the populations of Jordan and Syria are Iraqis. 21
Particularly unacceptable to both governments is the entry of Iraqi
Palestinians. Jordan, already seventy percent Palestinian because of
the Palestinian influxes of 1948 and 1967, has refused entry to Iraqi
Palestinians, while Syria since 2006 has sought to bar their entry as
18. BYMAN & POLLACK, supra note 12, at 55-58 (describing the birth of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghan refugees living in Pakistan).
19. Interview with David A. Korn, retired, State Department, in Wash., D.C.
(Jan. 24, 2008).
20. See Cambanis, supra note 17 (detailing Jordan’s policies cutting back the
number of Iraqi refugees permitted to enter the state); see also PATRICIA WEISS
FAGEN, IRAQI REFUGEES: SEEKING STABILITY IN SYRIA AND JORDAN 21 (2007),
available at http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/atPubs/Iraqi%20Refugees.pdf
(noting that while Syria has not closed its border with Iraq, it will implement new
regulations governing entry and limiting the number of visas granted to certain
groups of individuals).
21. See Bacon & Younes, supra note 8 (indicating that the influx of Iraqi
refugees into Jordan is the second refugee crisis Jordan has faced and the resultant
fears of the Jordanian kingdom of a “protracted refugee crisis”); Syria: Warning of
Looming Crisis as Iraqi Refugee Influx Continues, IRIN, http://www.irinnews.org/
report.aspx?ReportId=72967 (warning of the potential social and economic crisis
that may result from Syria’s burgeoning Iraqi refugee population).
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well. 22 After considerable negotiations, Syria did allow into a camp
in its northeast those stranded on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, but
other Palestinians were denied entry and remain in Al Tanf, a camp
in a no-man’s land between Syria and Iraq, as well as in a camp on
the Iraqi side of the border. 23 Syria has now begun to deport
hundreds of Iraqi Palestinians to Al Tanf. 24
The perilous situation faced by more than four million displaced
Iraqis is sometimes presented as a temporary problem, especially
when filtered through the positive political prism of the Bush
Administration. The return of tens of thousands of refugees since
mid-2007 has been cited as evidence of an improved security
environment, made possible by ‘the surge’ (the addition of 30,000
U.S. troops to the 130,000 already there).25 But when analyzing the
returns more closely, UNHCR found that most of the refugees
returned because their resources or visas ran out in Syria and
Jordan. 26 Moreover, many of those who returned could not reclaim
22. See Eric Londoño, Iceland Takes Palestinians Leaving Iraq, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 2008, at A15 (noting that the Syrian and Jordanian governments have
turned Palestinian refugees away “out of concern that thousands would follow”).
23. ASHRAF AL-KHALIDI, SOPHIA HOFFMAN & VICTOR TANNER, BROOKINGS
INST., IRAQI REFUGEES IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC: A FIELD-BASED
SNAPSHOT 14-15 (2007), available at http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/
200706iraq.pdf (noting that Palestinian refugees were allowed into Syria as part of
a convoy organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and
the UN Relief and Works Agency).
24. Interview with anonymous UNHCR Official, by e-mail (Feb. 29, 2008).
25. See Syria: Not Safe Enough for Iraqi Refugees to Return – UNHCR Chief,
IRIN, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=76738
[hereinafter Syria: Not Safe] (providing conflicting accounts of security in Iraq
coming from the Iraqi government and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees);
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq Government Busses
Refugees Home from Syria, UNHCR, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id=474d996c4 (quoting Iraqi officials crediting the
American troop surge with improved security in Baghdad).
26. See Iraq-Jordan: Few Iraqis Returning Home, IRIN, Dec. 9, 2007,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=75771 (contrasting the opinions of
Iraqi government officials that the return of refugees from Syria is the result of
improved security with that of aid agencies who claim that the return is the result
of increasingly inhospitable conditions in Syria, including stricter immigration
rules and financial considerations); Iraq-Syria: Starving to Survive: Iraqi Refugees
Resort to Desperate Measures, IRIN, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/
Report.aspx?ReportId=76062 (discussing the unsavory practices in which Iraqi
refugees have felt compelled to engage, including prolonged fasting and
prostitution, because they cannot otherwise afford to survive).
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their homes for security reasons or found them damaged beyond
repair. Nor could they find jobs or basic services. Some returned to
Syria, while most others became displaced inside the country. 27 Iraqi
government authorities have acknowledged that they do not have
sufficient capacity for handling returning refugees. 28 One Middle
East expert claimed that “[i]t would not be surprising if, 20 years
from now, millions of Iraqis still lived outside their home country.” 29
Taking into account the unique situation in which Iraq’s refugees
and IDPs find themselves, this article examines the problems facing
the displaced, the different solutions being proposed and possible
ways forward.

I. THE REFUGEE CRISIS
The flight across borders of some two million Iraqis, especially in
2006-07, has been described as “the world’s fastest growing
displacement crisis” 30 and the largest in the Middle East since the
Palestinian exodus. It is estimated that there are about 1 million Iraqi
refugees in Syria, 500,000 to 700,000 in Jordan and more than
400,000 in other neighboring countries. 31 By the end of 2006, the

27. Interview with anonymous UNHCR Official, by e-mail (Jan. 28, 2008).
28. See Abed Al-Samad Rahman Sultan, An Unenviable Task, FORCED
MIGRATION REV., June 2007, at 16 (expressing an urgent need for technical and
financial assistance to enable the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to
adequately discharge its duties); see also Iraq: Parliament Committee Demands
Fixed Budget to Aid the Displaced, IRIN, Feb. 10, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/
report.aspx?ReportId=76662 [hereinafter Parliament Committee Demands Fixed
Budget] (underscoring the urgent need for a complete policy and budget to assist
displaced Iraqis); Iraq: More Government Money for IDP’s, Refugees, IRIN, Feb.
14, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=76734 [hereinafter More
Government Money] (discussing the Iraqi Parliament’s proposal that between three
and five percent of national oil revenues be devoted to the problem of displaced
families).
29. Daniel Byman, The Next Phase of the Iraq War, SLATE, Nov. 15, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2178065/.
30. See generally KRISTELE YOUNES, REFUGEES INT’L, THE WORLD’S FASTEST
GROWING DISPLACEMENT CRISIS (Mar.
2007),
http://www.refugees
international.org/content/issue/detail/9915 (outlining the problems faced by
displaced persons inside Iraq and providing recommendations to improve the
situation).
31. See Bacon & Younes, supra note 8 (recognizing that refugees have flocked
to the major cities in the region, making it harder for them to be distinguished).
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high numbers caused Jordan to close its doors while Syria in the fall
of 2007 imposed visa restrictions to reduce the refugee flow. 32
In neither Syria nor Jordan do refugees have a clear legal status.
Neither government is party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”), 33 nor does either
recognize the rights to which refugees are entitled or the obligations
signatory states have toward those in their territory. While both
initially welcomed the refugees, their non-recognition of the Refugee
Convention is now putting many of these same people in jeopardy,
especially in Syria. The Refugee Convention, for example, provides
that refugees have the right to work, including self-employment, and
with treatment equal to the most favorable accorded to foreign
nationals, but in Syria, where the refugees are considered tourists or
guests, they are not officially allowed to work. 34 Although some
specialized professionals, such as teachers and doctors, have been
issued work permits, many work illegally or are unemployed as a
result of Syrian policies. 35 Unable to support themselves and their
families, and with depleted financial reserves, hundreds are now
leaving each day. 36 The Refugee Convention further provides that

32. See id. (reporting that the ability of Iraq's neighbors to handle such large
numbers is close to breaking point, that Jordan estimates the cost of the Iraqi
refugees within its territory to be one billion dollars a year; and that although Syria
boasts the largest number of Iraqi refugees, visa restrictions imposed in October
2007 made it more difficult for Iraqis to enter Syria); see also Cambanis, supra
note 17 (recognizing Jordan’s wariness of sectarian strife spreading from Iraq as
one of the reasons for the restrictions).
33. See States Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63
.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) (setting forth the 144 nations party to the
Convention).
34. See U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
arts. 17, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (stipulating that
signatory states must protect refugees’ rights to seek wage-earning employment
within a state territory on a level equal to the most favorable treatment accorded
nationals of a foreign country).
35. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that the
passports of Iraqi refugees are stamped upon entry into Syria, barring them from
working).
36. Interview with anonymous UNHCR official, by e-mail (Feb. 29, 2008); see
also Syria: Not Safe, supra note 25 (noting that, though the figure is disputed, the
Iraqi Red Crescent has reported that nearly 45,000 Iraqis returned to Iraq in the
four month period from September 2007 to December 2007).
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refugee children shall enjoy elementary education just as nationals
do. 37 Although Iraqis have free access to schools in Syria, in 2007,
statistics show that enrollment in Syrian schools is a mere “35,000
out of an estimated 250,000 school-aged Iraqi children,” and many
Iraqi families could not afford the required uniforms and school
supplies. 38 Access to adequate health care is also limited even
though Iraqis are provided with emergency medical and primary
health care. Thirty-six percent of refugees registered with UNHCR in
Syria had special medical needs. 39
In Jordan, the refugees are in a precarious situation. Following the
2005 suicide bombings in Amman by Iraqi nationals, the government
began to restrict entry and by 2007 had largely closed its doors, also
rounding up and deporting some Iraqis. Treated as guests or
sometimes as illegal immigrants, most Iraqis have been denied the
right to work: “in May 2007, only [twenty-two] percent of Iraqi
adults were employed.” 40 Only one-fifth of school-age refugee
children were in public schools although all Iraqi children were
theoretically given access to public education. 41 Refugees were able
to access emergency treatment in public hospitals, but to receive
continued treatment, they had to be residents. 42

37. See Refugee Convention, supra note 33, art. 37 (“The Contracting States
shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect
to elementary education.”).
38. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 13 (recognizing that many
Iraqi refugee families are forced to choose between “sending their children to
school or to work”); Interview with anonymous UNHCR official, supra note 36;
AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 33-34 (recognizing that
schools may turn children away if they fail to produce the required
documentation).
39. Ron Redmond, UNHCR Spokesperson, Statement at Press Briefing on
Iraq: Pressure on Safe Havens Inside and Outside Fuels Fears of Increased Internal
Displacement (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
iraq?page=briefing&id=471dc5653 (categorizing the special needs as including
medical, children and women at risk, the elderly, and the disabled).
40. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 15 (noting the resentment
among Jordanians caused by the influx of Iraqi refugees, which decreased wages
throughout Jordan).
41. See Presbyterian Church in Canada, Iraq: Assistance Needed for Internally
Displaced People and Refugees, PWS&D NEWSWIRE, Jan. 23, 2008,
http://www.presbyterian.ca/node/2557 (suggesting that this statistic is an
improvement on past numbers of Iraqi children attending school in Jordan).
42. See AMNESTY INT’L, MILLION IN FLIGHT: IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS 23 (Sept.
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While Iraqi refugees have provided some benefits to their host
countries (purchase of goods and services, additions to the job
market), rising inflation and deteriorating economic conditions in
Jordan and Syria have provided fertile ground for economic
resentments to surface against them, overriding initial feelings of
“Arab solidarity.” Schools and health services have become more
crowded and apartments more scarce. Jordanians in particular have
begun to blame Iraqis for a deteriorating quality of life due to higher
prices, increasingly unavailable and expensive housing, inflation, and
increased traffic and crime. 43 In Syria, many blame the refugees for
the rise in unemployment, the higher cost of food, fuel and water,
strains on electricity, and in particular, rent increases. As a result of
the Iraqi influx, Syria’s government has had to spend more for public
services and subsidies of goods such as bread, fuel, municipal water
and electricity. 44
It is unlikely therefore that Jordan or Syria will accommodate a
long-term presence of Iraqis. Neither country has developed a plan to
integrate Iraqi refugees. This makes return to Iraq the only serious
option, even though most do not want to return 45 and the likelihood
2007), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/041/2007/en/dom-MDE14
0412007en.pdf (recognizing that private hospitals generally do not have residency
requirements, but are often too expensive for Iraqi refugees).
43. See FAGEN, supra note 20, at 12 (underscoring that although the Jordanian
government has worked to manage the strain on public services created by Iraqi
refugees through public subsidies and additional personnel, it has been unable to
keep up with the increased demand); see also Robert F. Worth, Rising Inflation
Prompts Unease in Middle East, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at A1 (illustrating the
inability of the Jordanian government to maintain public subsidy programs and the
impact of the removal of a subsidy on fuel on the cost of food).
44. See IRAQI REFUGEES IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, supra note 23, at 41
(reporting that, according to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the influx of
Iraqi refugees caused “[t]he demand for bread [to rise] 35 percent, costing the state
$34 million,” and the increased demand for water cost Syria roughly $7 million);
see also ELIZABETH FERRIS & MATTHEW HALL, BROOKINGS INST., UPDATE ON
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AND POLITICS IN IRAQ 8 (July 6, 2006), available at
http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20070706.pdf
(underscoring
the
increased costs to the Syrian government of public schooling and state subsidized
goods resulting from the Iraqi refugee population); Andrew Harper, Iraq: Growing
Needs Amid Continuing Displacement, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Dec. 2007, at 53
(noting that increased demand has overcome the ability of the Syrian government
to meet the demand for electricity).
45. See Iraq: UNHCR Concerned About Funding for Refugees, IDPs, IRIN,
Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=77990 [hereinafter
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of their finding resettlement in the industrialized countries is small. 46
For the time being, the security situation in Iraq is still sufficiently
uncertain that the UNHCR has not revised the requests it made to the
governments of Jordan and Syria to refrain from forcibly deporting
refugees back to Iraq. 47 Among the groups unlikely to return are
religious minorities subject to persecution, in particular Christians
(representing some fifteen to twenty percent of the registered
refugees). 48 Yet for Jordan and Syria to host many refugees for
extended stays, they will need considerable international help. But
even with more help, the governments in the region might not agree
to accept long-term strains on their infrastructure and societies.

A. TERRORISTS OR VICTIMS?
Fears are often expressed that without adequate assistance the
refugees in Syria and Jordan could become a source of terrorism and
violence in the region. Iraqi specialist Daniel Byman, for example,
has warned that the Iraqi refugee crisis could destabilize an already
volatile Middle East. 49 Humanitarian advocates regularly bolster
their arguments for providing aid to the refugees by pointing out the

UNHCR Concerned] (highlighting a UNHCR survey that found that only four
percent of the Syrian refugees surveyed plan to return to Iraq).
46. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 22-23 (recognizing that
Iraqis seeking asylum in industrialized nations are constrained by the cost of
traveling and the restrictive policies in industrialized nations, including visa and
passport restrictions requiring refugees to acquire a passport in Baghdad).
47. See Syria: Not Safe, supra note 25 (highlighting comments made by UN
High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres that Iraq remained too unstable
to support returning refugees and Syria’s subsequent pledge not to forcibly deport
Iraqi refugees); see also Jordan’s King Meets Guterres, Pledges Continued
Hosting of Iraqis, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (Hamburg, Germany), Feb. 12,
2008 [hereinafter King Meets Guterres] (emphasizing King Abdullah II of Jordan’s
commitment to supporting Iraqi refugees until the security situation in Iraq
stabilized).
48. See Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, All Things Considered: Archbishop’s Slaying
Rocks Iraq’s Christian Minority (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 13, 2008), available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88200212&ft=1&f=1001
(noting that despite not being involved in the conflict in Iraq, the Christian
minority were targets of the violence and were portrayed as allies of American
forces).
49. See Byman, supra note 29 (recognizing the impact of the Palestinian
refugee crisis on the wars between Israel and its neighbors and cautioning that a
similar outcome may result from a failure to address the Iraqi refugee crisis).
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security consequences of not providing aid. As Elizabeth Ferris of
the Brookings Institution warns, “[i]f the refugees do not receive
sufficient support from the host governments and the international
community, there is a very real danger that political actors will seek
to fill the gap.” 50 Similarly, a UNHCR official pointed out that the
state security agencies in Jordan and Syria “are aware that Iraqis are
changing the character of their societies and fear that their presence
may ignite sectarian and ethnic conflict.” 51 Given the explosive
environment in the Middle East, such concerns bear heeding. The
presence of more than half a million Iraqis in Jordan, a country of
only six million people, could well have consequences for its
domestic politics and security. Although most of the refugees are
Sunni, roughly one quarter are Shi’a and some have been moving
into militant neighborhoods. 52 In the case of Syria, “numerous
sources confirm that both Sunni and Shi’a radical armed groups have
people” in that country, with the Sunni Ba’athist resistance having
the strongest presence. 53 An increasing number of “politically active,
Islamist-oriented Iraqis” could pose a threat to the government’s
secular rule. 54
At the same time, it bears emphasizing that most refugees in Syria
and Jordan have been the victims of violence and threats, not the
50. ELIZABETH FERRIS, BROOKINGS INST., SECURITY, DISPLACEMENT AND
IRAQ: A DEADLY COMBINATION 17 (Aug. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/0827humanrights_ferris/2
0070827.pdf.
51. Harper, supra note 44, at 53.
52. See id. at 52-53 (noting that Shi’ites constitute less than twenty-five percent
of Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan, while more than fifty percent are Sunnis); see
also FERRIS, supra note 50, at 13 (highlighting reports of local NGOs that Iraqi
refugees are increasingly moving into the Zarqa neighborhood of Amman, which is
known to Jordanian media as “a cradle of Islamic militancy” and is the hometown
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq).
53. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 15 (noting that the
presence of the Ba’athist resistance is widely acknowledged, from the U.S.
government to the Arab media).
54. See FERRIS, supra note 50, at 15 (recognizing the historical security
concern of the Syrian government with the growth of political Islam, including the
use of military force to expel the Muslim Brotherhood from the state in 1982); see
also Nir Rosen, The Flight From Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007 (magazine), at
40 (recognizing that Syria has balanced its relationship with sectarian groups, but
this balance may soon become untenable and may threaten the stability of the
state).
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perpetrators. 55 Further, it is not clear that those who had radical ties
in Iraq will remain part of those organizations once out of the
country. What might have been essential for survival in Iraq need not
be continued in Jordan or Syria, so the argument that the refugees are
potential security risks to their host countries must be carefully
weighed against other factors:
• The refugees are not in camps, but dispersed in urban areas,
mixed in with the general population where it would be far
more difficult to militarize and manipulate their members. 56
• In a country like Syria, the police apparatus is so controlling
that it is unlikely that terrorist plots could be easily hatched. In
Jordan, King Abdullah II has publicly warned that “we will
never allow Jordan to become a staging ground for initiating
problems within Iraq.” 57
• The profile of the refugees is markedly different from that of
refugee populations where violence and jihad became a serious
issue. The mujahadeen from Afghanistan and the Hutu
genocidaires from Rwanda, often cited as precedents, were
imbued with the desire to overthrow or undermine the
governments left behind (e.g., the Soviet dominated regime in
Kabul and the Tutsi dominated government in Kigali). 58 The
Iraqi refugees, by contrast, are mostly middle class and urban
professionals who fled sectarian and generalized violence. 59
55. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 15-16
(recognizing that although there are Iraqi radical groups operating among Iraqi
refugees in Syria, the majority of Iraqi refugees, both in Syria and in the other
refugee-accepting states, are victims of the conflict).
56. See FERRIS, supra note 50, at 20 (noting that funding education and
avoiding the creation of refugee camps ensures “alternative activities for young
people who might otherwise turn to crime or militias”).
57. Interview by Asharq Al Aswat with King Abdullah II of Jordan, in Jordan
(Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/hmka01232007.htm.
58. See Byman & Pollack, supra note 12, at 5-6 (discussing the origins of the
mujahadeen from Afghanistan and the Hutu genocidaires from Rwanda and how
these movements came to fruition from refugee crises); see generally STEPHEN
JOHN STEDMAN & FRED TANNER, BROOKINGS INST., REFUGEE MANIPULATION:
WAR, POLITICS, AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN SUFFERING 57-134 (2003) (detailing
how the motivations of the refugees and the support of the international
community and the host state contributed to the militarization of refugees and
continued violence in their home state).
59. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 45 (noting that
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While many do not identify with the “new Iraq,” which since
their departure has become more conservative, less secular, and
dominated by Shi’a with ties to Iran, they do not fit the profile
of people seeking to overthrow their government. In fact the
profile of the refugees points more to a serious brain drain for
Iraq than an insurgent threat. Since 2003, “[forty] percent of the
country’s professional class has left the country,” including a
disproportionate number of people with managerial and
administrative backgrounds and fifty percent of its 34,000
medical doctors, while the number of teachers in Baghdad has
fallen by eighty percent. 60 “Whereas less than [one percent] of
Iraqis had a postgraduate education, nearly [ten percent] of
refugees in Syria had advanced degrees, including [four and a
half percent] with doctorates.” 61 To be sure, since 2006, less
affluent and educated Iraqis have also fled to Syria and Jordan,
but according to one study, the influx has not produced the kind
of “generalized poverty, misery or despair among the Iraqi
refugees” that could lead to jihad and violence.62 According to
a U.N. official who served in the area, refugees needing to

146 of 192 Iraqi refugees interviewed were from the middle class).
60. See Elizabeth Ferris, Address: Iraq’s Displacement Crisis and International
Response (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/
2007/1206_iraq_ferris.aspx?p=1 (noting that the professional class “are most likely
to have the means, will, and capabilities to remain outside their country”); see also
Elizabeth Ferris, Address: Humanitarian Issues and Politics in Iraq (Feb. 14, 2007),
available
at
http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20070706.pdf
(underscoring that the loss of such professionals will result in problems with
reconstruction); News Release, World Health Organization, Violence Threatens
Health in Iraq (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/releases/2007/pr15/en/index.html (noting that the “government estimates that
almost 70% of critically injured patients with violence-related wounds die while in
emergency and intensive care units due to a shortage of competent staff and a lack
of drugs and equipment”).
61. Michael Schwartz, Iraq’s Tidal Wave of Misery: The First History of the
Planet’s Worst Refugee Crisis, TOMDISPATCH.COM (2008), http://www.tom
dispatch.com/post/174892.
62. See AL-KHALIDI, HOFFMAN & TANNER, supra note 23, at 44-45 (noting that
only 10% of the Iraqis interviewed were poor, but that percentage could rapidly
change without international recognition of the problem of Iraqi refugees).
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support themselves and their families have become “far more
vulnerable to prostitution than to terrorism.” 63

B. THE U.S. ROLE
Many have looked to the United States to play the principal role in
resolving the Iraq refugee problem. However, at a public forum at
Georgetown University in March 2007, a representative of the State
Department refused to acknowledge any special responsibility in this
case. 64 In testimony before Congress in January 2007, Ellen
Sauerbrey, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Refugees and Migration, stated that the Iraqi refugees had become a
“very top priority” for the United States, but expressed little urgency
about expediting refugee resettlement. 65 As former U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N. John Bolton explained it, sectarian violence, not
American actions, created the refugee problem so it was therefore
not the United States’ responsibility: “Our obligation . . . was to give
them new institutions and provide security. We have fulfilled that
obligation. I don’t think we have an obligation to compensate for the
hardships of war.” 66
Pressure from members of Congress, humanitarian and human
rights NGOs, and the public has produced pledges by the Bush
Administration to speed up resettlement. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2006
(October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006), only 202 Iraqis were
admitted, and in FY 2007 (October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007),
1,608, and most of these were backlogged cases of Iraqis who had
fled the Saddam Hussein regime. It was not until May 2007 that
63. Interview with anonymous UN official, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 19,
2008); see Katherine Zoepf, Iraqi Refugees, in Desperation, Turn to the Sex Trade
in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1 (describing women who engage in
prostitution to support their families).
64. See Bartlett, supra note 15 (in the question period he said that the U.S. did
not distinguish between the Iraqi refugees and other refugee caseloads).
65. See Rachel L. Swarns, Senators Denounce Bush Policy Limiting Refuge for
Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at A8 (blaming the time-consuming process of
determining who is a refugee as a reason for the slow process of refugee
resettlement); see also Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Iraq Translators Face Closed Door
U.S. Immigration Policy, FOX NEWS, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,250595,00.html (noting that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is unable
to handle the number of applications for resettlement it receives).
66. Rosen, supra note 54, at 74, 78.
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refugees who fled post-war Iraq began to enter the United States. In
FY 2008 (October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008) the United States
admitted 12,000 Iraqis, largely in response to the adoption by
Congress of the “Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act,” which seeks to
expedite the entry into the U.S. of Iraqi refugees. 67 But to advocacy
groups, the total falls “far short of needs.” 68
The resources made available have also been limited. In FY 2006,
the U.S. contributed $43 million for Iraqi refugees and IDPs,
increasing this to $171 million in FY 2007, while the needs in Jordan
and Syria were estimated at more than $2.6 billion. 69 After members
of Congress and NGOs urged the U.S. to fund at least fifty percent of
UNHCR’s January 2008 appeal for $261 million, the United States
increased its share to $95.4 million and added to its contributions to
other international organizations, making for an overall total of $208
million by April 2008. 70 But this starkly contrasted with the $70
billion the U.S. appropriated for the military effort in Iraq in FY2008
67. See O’DONNELL & NEWLAND, supra note 10, at 2, 19-20 (recognizing that
the Act was an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act passed
by Congress in December 2007).
68. See Press Release, Refugees Int’l, U.S. Goals for Iraqi Refugees are
Inadequate, Sept. 12, 2008 available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/
press-room/press-release/release-us-goals-iraqi-refugees-are-inadequate.
69. See Dep’t of State Fact Sheet, supra note 14 (calculating the total funding
that the United States spent on humanitarian assistance for refugees and IDPs in
Iraq, as well as how much aid is allocated for international organizations and nongovernmental organizations); Bacon & Younes, supra note 8 (reporting that the
U.N. estimated that the U.S. spent about $105 million in 2007 to accommodate
Iraqi refugees while Jordon estimated that the cost of harboring Iraqi refugees is
nearly $1 billion a year); see also US Contributes More Than $125 Million to
International Organizations to Aid Displaced Iraqis, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb.
14, 2008 (reporting that the United States contributed $46 million in humanitarian
aid for IDPs and refugees in Iraq in January of 2008 and an additional $125 million
in February 2008).
70. See US Contributes More Than $125 Million, supra note 69 (providing an
itemized list of international organizations that will receive the additional
humanitarian aid from the U.S. for IDPs and refugees, including the UNHCR, the
United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Health Organization); Letter from
Representative Alcee L. Hastings & Representative John D. Dingell to President
George W. Bush (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.csce.gov (follow
“Newsroom” hyperlink; then follow “Press Releases” hyperlink; then browse
Recent Press Releases for “January 2008”; then follow “Reps. Hastings and
Dingell Urge Increased Funding for Iraqi Refugees” hyperlink) (communicating
the Congressmen’s view that the United States should fund at least half of the
UNHCR’s proposal for $261 million in refugee assistance).
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and led members of Congress to call for more than $1 billion for
Iraq’s refugees and IDPs in FY2009. 71
As matters stand in the closing months of 2008, the United States
can best help promote a solution to Iraq’s displacement crisis by
taking the following steps:
• Insist that the government of Iraq devote the resources and
develop the plans for the safe and sustainable returns of the
bulk of the refugees, and provide the training and guidance for
it to do so. Although the government of Iraq has set aside funds
to give free transportation and start-up money to returning
families (a promise not always kept), and has been trying to
promote the return of medical doctors, there appears to be no
long-term planning or capacity to support those returning to
Iraq. In fact, the UN reports relatively small numbers trying to
return. 72 Some face threats and violence upon return, encounter
problems in gaining access to basic services, and have to
struggle to revive their livelihoods or find new sources of
income. 73
• Press the government of Iraq to adequately compensate
neighboring states for sheltering Iraqi refugees beyond the $25
million given in 2008.
• Mobilize U.S. and international resources to adequately help
the refugees and ensure that Jordan, Syria, and other

71. See Hastings & Dingell, supra note 70 (declaring that underfunding the
humanitarian crisis in Iraq is both a moral failure of the United States and a
security threat).
72. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR GLOBAL
REPORT 2007 306 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/
484908962.pdf (stating that the absence of security and essential services in Iraq
prevented UNHCR from promoting “repatriation” in 2007, although repatriation is
helping a limited number of Iraqis).
73. See Press Release, International Organization for Migration, Tent Camp
Assessment Reveals Grim Reality in Iraq (Aug. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAF/cache/offonce?entryId=18137 [hereinafter
IOM Press Release] (describing deplorable health conditions and cultural factors
that discourage Iraqis from choosing to live in tent camps); UNHCR Concerned,
supra note 45 (providing UNHCR survey results that found that although many
refugees may have contact with people still living in Iraq, they are unlikely to
return permanently because of the general violence or because their homes, work
and/or families were destroyed).
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neighboring states receive the assistance needed for assuming
the lion’s share of the burden.
• Press Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf States to admit
refugees and to provide financial aid to Jordan and Syria.
• Work with Syria and Jordan to develop plans for the integration
of those who can not, or choose not to, return home, with
special attention paid to educational and employment
opportunities.
• Take in greater numbers of refugees to the United States,
including more Iraqis who worked for the Unites States, and
urge other states to increase the refugee numbers they admit.
One reason the Bush Administration has failed to do more to help
Iraq’s refugees is that doing so would require an implicit admission
that its policies have not produced peace and stability in Iraq but
rather a refugee crisis. A change in administration will therefore
doubtless be needed before a more constructive policy can be
adopted. As a Presidential Candidate, Barack Obama expressed
support for a large increase in humanitarian aid for the refugees to
total $2 billion but has not yet provided many policy details. 74 Some
experts have proposed a massive resettlement program modeled after
the one that brought hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese to the
United States. 75 But this followed a defeat that no U.S.
administration may be ready to acknowledge in Iraq. Although
UNHCR has identified up to 100,000 Iraqis in pressing need of
resettlement (they can neither remain safely in their host countries
nor return safely to Iraq), leading Republican members of Congress
have taken the position that “the last thing we want to do is to have
people who are friendly to democracy . . . moving here in large
numbers at a time when they’re needed to build a new, thriving Iraq

74. See Barack Obama, War in Iraq, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/
(last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (expressing Obama’s support for preventing a
humanitarian crisis by contributing to neighboring countries, assisting the
resettlement of IDPs, and prosecuting war crimes).
75. But see FAGEN, supra note 20, at 23-24 (noting that states in Southeast Asia
were largely unwilling to host the refugees and pressed for resettlement, which
contributed to the U.S. commitment to this option); see, e.g., Byman, supra note 29
(comparing the Iraqi refugee crisis to the refugee crisis following the 1948 Israeli
war of independence).

COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

1/22/2009 6:03:45 PM

IRAQ’S DISPLACED

321

. . . . Now is the time that we should be calling on the refugees from
Iraq to go home.” 76
For Iraqis at risk because they worked for the United States,
attention has focused on Operation Pacific Haven, carried out by the
Clinton Administration in 1996-97 to remove 6,600 Kurds from
northern Iraq whose lives were in danger for having worked with the
United States. 77 The U.S. government successfully accelerated their
screening and resettlement so that they could arrive (via Guam) in 90
to 120 days. 78 When the operation ended, the Department of Defense
predicted that it would “undoubtedly be a role model for future
humanitarian efforts.” 79 To date, the Bush Administration has given
no consideration to this option, but a future administration would do
well to revisit the program.

II. THE IDP PROBLEM
The 2.7 million people internally displaced in Iraq serve as a
constant reminder that the country, in many respects, is a
dysfunctional state. The Iraqi government proved unable to prevent
the forced displacement of people in Baghdad, its own capital, as
well as in other urban centers. In fact, radical Sunni and Shi’a
militias who drove the 2006-07 sectarian violence were tied to
political parties, police and army units. The Ministry of the Interior is
76. Walter Pincus, House Panel Debates Iraq Refugee Quandary, WASH. POST,
Mar. 17, 2008, at A15 (quoting Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, ranking minority member
of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee).
77. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs), Operation Pacific Haven Wraps Up Humanitarian
Efforts (Apr. 15, 1997), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid
=1218 (announcing the successful conclusion of a 218-day operation in which
Kurdish evacuees were brought to Guam and provided with medical care and
clothing to prepare them for assimilation into the United States).
78. See id. (comparing the expedited asylum procedure used for Kurdish
evacuees to the typical asylum process, which can take from six months to two
years per individual).
79. See id. (quoting Joint Task Force Operation Pacific Haven commander
Major General John Dallager); see also George Packer, The Guam Option, THE
NEW YORKER, Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
georgepacker/2007/11/the-guam-option.html (challenging the Bush Administration
to copy the Kurdish relocation program despite the negative publicity that might
arise).
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still widely reported to be infiltrated by Shi’a militias, which
assaulted and expelled people from their homes, sometimes in police
uniforms. 80 In such a political environment, it is not surprising that
the government has failed to exhibit the will, resources or skills to
deal with the needs of the displaced. In the Ministry of Displacement
and Migration, it is not unusual to find staff that sees the displaced
only from the perspective of their own ethnic or religious group. 81
More than 1.5 million of Iraq’s IDPs were uprooted following the
February 2006 bombing of the al-Aksari Shi’a shrine in Samarra. 82
Although the sectarian violence had started earlier, once Shi’a
restraint ended, the violence accelerated and sectarian-induced
displacement sharply overtook the displacement caused by military
operations, generalized violence, and the expulsions from the
Saddam Hussein period. 83 Shi’a and Sunni militias systematically
and purposefully began to intimidate, harass, kill and expel people of
the opposite ethnicity from their neighborhoods in order to gain
control over those areas and expand their power base. The result has
been an Iraq increasingly fragmented along religious and ethnic
lines, with segregated areas in Baghdad and other urban centers.
80. See ASHRAF AL-KHALIDI & VICTOR TANNER, BROOKINGS INST.,
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE: RADICAL GROUPS DRIVE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ
13 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20061018_
DisplacementinIraq_Khalidi-Tanner.pdf (discussing instances of Shi’a militias
operating in police uniforms and the police force’s inability to stop an attack on the
Abu Hanifa mosque); Solomon Moore, Ominous Signs Remain in City Run by
Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at A1 (reporting that ethnic militia control
police and incite ethnic violence even in homogeneous Iraqi cities, like Basra).
81. Interview with anonymous Ministry of Displacement and Migration staff,
in Wash. D.C. (July 13, 2005).
82. See Patrick Cockburn, Iraq is Disintegrating as Ethnic Cleansing Takes
Hold, THE INDEPENDENT, May 20, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/middle-east/iraq-is-disintegrating-as-ethnic-cleansing-takes-hold-478937.ht
ml (identifying the bombing of al-Aksari Shi’a shrine in Samarra as a major factor
that edged Iraq closer to civil war and set off a wave of displacement as people fled
from the violence).
83. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 7-8 (describing ruthless
strategies employed by both Shi’a and Sunni radical groups, such as targeting
youth, creating violence in mixed neighborhoods, and attacking the other’s
mosques); INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN
REVIEW 1 (2007) [hereinafter IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW],
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/2007_
year_in_review.pdf (highlighting the spike in displacement that occurred following
the February 2006 Samarra bombing and subsequent violence).
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Sunnis and Shi’a pushed from their homes have mostly gone to areas
where their group is in the majority while Christians have fled to
parts of Ninewah province and Kurds to the northern Kurdish
areas. 84
At least forty percent of those who fled do not expect to return 85
since their displacement reflects deep-seated political divisions
within the country. Indeed, the brutality used in uprooting them was
intended to ensure that they would not return to their home areas. 86
Many, in fact, sold their homes or abandoned their property when
they fled, indicating that they do not plan to return. 87 Given “the
departure of entire families and, in some cases, communities,”
internal displacement “is likely to be long-term.” 88 The more
prolonged it becomes, the less likely substantial returns will occur.
Sizeable numbers of minority groups—Kurds, Christians,
Sabeans, Turkmen, and Roma—as well as foreign nationals—
Palestinians and Sudanese—were also uprooted by the sectarian
violence. These expulsions came in addition to Saddam Hussein’s
earlier uprooting of more than 100,000 Kurds (and also Turkmen and

84. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 21-26 (explaining the
displacement of religious and ethnic groups from regions where they are not a
majority, as well as where they went); see Interview with anonymous UNHCR
official, supra note 24 (noting that in 2008, UNHCR found increasing numbers of
Christians who fled to Ninewah fleeing again, this time abroad in search of safety);
see AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 21-26 (recognizing that of the
estimated 1.5 million IDPs uprooted since the Samarra bombing, many (560,000)
are in the center of the country in Baghdad governorate, twenty-seven percent in
the south, and fifteen percent in the northern governorates). Of the estimated
million displaced before 2006, fifty-three percent are in the north and thirty-three
percent in the south. Id.
85. See IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 4, 7
(reporting that twenty-two percent of IDPs plan to remain in their current location,
while seventeen percent plan to resettle in a third location, and two percent are
undecided if they are going to return, or settle elsewhere); Internal Displacement
Update for Iraq, UNHCR, Apr. 1, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=briefing&id=47f20efd6 (finding that as of April 2008,
some 6,000 IDP families returned (two percent of those uprooted since 2006),
mostly to areas where their communities were in the majority).
86. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 12-15 (demonstrating that the
ethnic cleansing is neither spontaneous nor popular but carefully calculated to
achieve political ends).
87. See FERRIS & HALL, supra note 44, at 2-3.
88. Harper, supra note 44, at 51.
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Assyrians) from Kirkuk and its surrounding areas in order to
‘Arabize’ this highly fertile region, which contains from ten to
twenty percent of Iraq’s oil reserves, To reverse this ethnic cleansing,
Kurds after the 2003 war began to return and try to reclaim their
homes and land, but many found these to be occupied by others and
became internally displaced again. Soon thereafter, Kurdish
authorities began to reestablish control over the region, and some
100,000 Arabs fled or were pushed out by the Pesh Merga.
Meanwhile, Kirkuk’s Turkmen look to Turkey to protect their
interests there. Because of the intensity of competing claims, Kirkuk
has become a tinderbox of potential conflict and displacement. 89
Most of Iraq’s internally displaced persons, whether in the north,
center or south, face extreme hardship, many with urgent needs for
shelter, food, medicine, clean water, employment and basic
security. 90 The decrease in sectarian violence since the summer of
2007 has reduced displacement but has not significantly improved
conditions for the displaced. 91 In fact, in August 2008, the
International Organization of Migration (“IOM”) reported a
“worsening” in the situation, estimating that more than seventy

89. See AL-KHALIDI & TANNER, supra note 80, at 23-25 (accounting for the
displacement of Kurdish, Christian, and third-country nationals, particularly
Palestinians and Sudanese, by Sunni and Shi’a radicals); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
VOL. 16, NO. 4(E), CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN
NORTHERN IRAQ 2-4 (2004) (providing context to the conflict between the Kurds
and Arabs over Kirkuk and Mosul, which has been ongoing since the 1930s and
has been largely ignored by the United States in Iraq); Michael O’Hanlan & Omer
Taspinar, Op-Ed., Time for Kurdish Realism, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at A15
(arguing that Kurds should promote regional stability in Iraq because sharing
Kirkuk will better serve Kurdish, Iraqi, and American interests in the long-term);
ELIZABETH FERRIS & KIMBERLY STOLZ, BROOKINGS INST., THE FUTURE OF
KIRKUK: THE REFERENDUM AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON DISPLACEMENT 1
(2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0303
_iraq_ferris/0303_iraq_ferris.pdf (recognizing the contentious nature of Kirkuk’s
status and the potential for producing displacement).
90. See Sultan, supra note 28, at 17 (urging Iraqi refugees not to return to Iraq
because internal aid distribution is so limited).
91. See IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 4
(noting that returning IDPs often are subject to violence and maltreatment). THE
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE IN IRAQ, IRAQI RED CRESCENT ORGANIZATION
UPDATE 28 3 (2007), available at http://www.iraqredcrescent.org/IDP_28_
update_EN.pdf (detailing the challenges faced by IDPs in acquiring healthcare,
education, and affordable shelter).
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percent of IDPs do not have regular access to food rations from the
Public Distribution System; fourteen percent have no access to health
care; thirty-three percent cannot obtain the medications they need;
and thirty-one percent have found their property occupied by
others. 92 While the vast majority of IDPs stay with families and
friends that support them or rent homes, their situation has become
precarious as rents increase, jobs grow scarce, and their hosts begin
to run out of resources. At least twenty percent of the displaced can
now be found in abandoned buildings, military bases, schools, parks,
cemeteries, and soccer fields. One to two percent reside in tented
camps, which lack basic services and tend to be in remote areas. 93
Although most of Iraq’s eighteen governorates have set up camp
areas for IDPs, by the beginning of 2008 they began to restrict the
number coming into their areas. According to a UNHCR official, the
displaced have been “left largely to fend for themselves.” 94

A. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Thus far, the national government has not demonstrated that it has
the skills, resources, or political will to take care of its displaced
population or provide the security, access to basic services, and
livelihoods needed for the return of large numbers to their homes.
Government agencies have often been described as incompetent,
negligent, corrupt, or sectarian in approach. 95 The Iraqi Minister of

92. See IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 6; see
also IOM Press Release, supra note 73 (depicting the difficult life in tent camps
due to a lack of basic services, unemployment, and overcrowding).
93. See Harper, supra note 44, at 51-52 (stating that the poor conditions in tent
camps lead to violence, psychological stress, and, for children, malnutrition, and
that though the percentage in actual tent camps is low, an additional twenty percent
reside in collective settlements).
94. See id. at 53.
95. See Iraq: NGOs Urge Action on Displacement Crisis, IRIN, Aug. 13, 2008,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=79798 (recognizing the failure of
the Iraqi government to address the needs of IDPs and refugees and calling for the
strengthening of Iraqi institutions); Iraq: Government Negligent in Tackling
Human Displacement, IRIN, May 13, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.
aspx?ReportId=78172 [hereinafter Iraq Government Negligent] (reporting that the
Iraqi government’s inability to solve the IDP crisis fuels militia membership and
can lead to terrorist activity); Iraq: IDPs Demand Government Return Them Home,
IRIN, June 15, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=78749
(quoting the head of Iraq’s parliament’s Displacement and Migration Committee,
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Displacement and Migration explained that “[o]ur ministry, unlike
others established when the state of Iraq was founded, is without any
administrative legacy or institutional knowledge in the field of
migration and displacement.” 96 He therefore has called for a local,
regional and international response. In January 2008, the head of
parliament’s displacement committee Abdul-Khaliq Zankana
announced that the government would allocate additional funds for
IDPs, but acknowledged that “a plan for using this money has not
been drawn up yet.” 97
Local authorities, neighborhoods and mosques have sometimes
proven more effective in aid distribution although they can also be
partisan and do not usually provide housing and jobs. Assisting these
efforts at the community level have been local non-governmental
organizations [“NGO”], like the Iraqi Red Crescent, which have
provided assistance to large numbers of IDPs, but most have limited
capacity, may suffer from mismanagement and have not been able to
reach many of those in need because of lack of security.
Filling the void left by the government have been radical sectarian
Sunni and Shi’a groups (the largest being the movement affiliated
with Moqtada al-Sadr). Indeed, a Feinstein International Center study
found that, “[i]ncreasingly, Iraqis are looking to militias and ad hoc
neighborhood organizations as their option of first resort when
seeking protection and assistance.” 98 Similarly, members of

stating that the IDP crisis could go unsolved for another decade if the Iraqi
government does not soon address it); KRISTELE YOUNES & NIR ROSEN, REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL, UPROOTED AND UNSTABLE: MEETING URGENT HUMANITARIAN
NEEDS IN IRAQ 3, 6 (2008), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/
publication/detail/10570/ (blaming the Iraqi government’s inadequate response to
the IDP crisis in part on the role that sectarian bias has in the distribution of aid).
96. Sultan, supra note 28, at 16-17.
97. See Parliament Allocates More Money for IDPs, IRIN, Jan. 24, 2008,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=76404 (comparing the diversity
and gravity of tasks for which the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration is
responsible to the scant resources made available to it); More Government Money,
supra note 28 (reporting that in February 2008 the government earmarked $40
million for IDPs and refugees).
98. GREG HANSEN, FEINSTEIN INT’L CENTER, COMING TO TERMS WITH THE
HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVE IN IRAQ 8 (2007), available at http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)./A070E41CF0D611D1C1
257292005AB87F/$file/pdf_HA2015_Iraq_Briefing_Paper.pdf; see YOUNES &
ROSEN, supra note 95, at i, 2-4 (reporting that IDPs are joining militias to secure
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Parliament have warned that continued inattention to the displaced
could make them “easy prey to militias and armed gangs inside Iraq
and possible recruits to intelligence services outside Iraq.” 99
In July 2008, the government introduced a National Policy to
Address Displacement 100 at a two-day conference that brought
together central and local government officials, U.N. agencies and
national and international NGOs. It commits the government to assist
and protect IDPs, as well as refugees who return, without
discrimination and promises to mobilize the resources required and
strengthen government offices to improve the national response. 101 In
particular, it promises to improve the access of the displaced to basic
services, to help them find employment, to protect them from
evictions and violence, to assist them reclaim their property, and to
encourage reconciliation between the different ethnic and religious
groups upon return. 102 Much of the policy, however, is in the form of
recommendations that will need to be carried out. While it marks an
important first step toward addressing displacement, the capacity and
will of the government to implement its provisions will need to be
demonstrated.
The international community has also been slow to recognize the
humanitarian and security crisis inside Iraq. For years, the U.S. and
Iraqi governments assumed that the domestic situation would
stabilize and that the IDPs would return home. As a result, billions of
dollars in international aid focused on recovery and development
programs that couldn’t be implemented because of the violence.

food, clothing and security).
99. Iraq Government Negligent, supra note 95.
100. See Press Release, Ministry of Displacement & Migration and United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Improving the Rights of the Displaced
(July 8, 2008), available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Press%20release%
20E%20UNHCR%208%20July%202008.pdf [hereinafter Ministry Press Release]
(announcing the formation of the National Policy to Address Displacement,
intended to serve as a tool to facilitate the return of Iraqi IDPs and refugees).
101. Id. (asserting that the National Policy to Address Displacement is striving
to create a safe return for 240,000 displaced Iraqi families).
102. See id. (quoting Daniel Endres, a representative of UNHCR in Iraq, as
stating, “[b]y adopting this National Policy the Government of Iraq makes it clear
that it wants to strengthen the protection of and assistance to displaced persons,
and it indicates its willingness to work towards durable solutions for the
displaced”).
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More recently, a reassessment of donor priorities and U.N. programs
has begun to take place.
Greater international humanitarian presence is one of the
priorities. Unlike in most other crises, international humanitarian
organizations and international NGOs do not operate directly on the
ground in Iraq except in parts of the north. Since the 2003 bombing
of the U.N. headquarters, most humanitarian organizations moved
their international staff out of Baghdad to Amman where they have
operated by “remote management.” 103 In August 2007, the U.N.
Security Council voted to expand the United Nations’ mandate and
presence in the country. 104 The U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq is
expected to work with the government in support of the delivery of
humanitarian aid and to promote the safe and voluntary return of
IDPs and refugees.
The extent, however, to which the U.N. will be able to increase its
humanitarian presence throughout Iraq is not yet known. The
decrease in violence since the summer of 2007 has not ended
security threats against humanitarian staff, especially U.N. staff, who
are often perceived as being allied with coalition forces. For the
International Organization for Migration, “Iraq continues to be one
of the most dangerous places in the world for humanitarian agencies
to work.” 105 Between March 2003 and late 2006, some eighty-one
local and international humanitarian and human rights workers were

103. But see Cecile Pouilly, Difficult Delivery: The ‘remote management’ of aid
in Iraq, Vol. 146, Issue 2, REFUGEES, Apr. 2007, at 14 (quoting a UN refugee
agency Iraqi employee as stating, “[r]emote management is not an option. It’s a
one-way street . . . [w]e don’t have other options to choose from.”); YOUNES &
ROSEN, supra note 95, at 8 (providing examples of UN agencies that have local
staff throughout Iraq, such as UNICEF and the International Organization for
Migration).
104. See S.C. Res. 1770, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1770 (Aug. 10, 2007)
(declaring an extended mandate of twelve months in addition to other efforts
intended to assist in reconciliation and reintegration efforts that foster an orderly
return of Iraqi IDPs and refugees).
105. IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 83, at 6; see Press
Release, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Officials Call
for Improved Security and Access to Reach Iraqis in Need (Apr. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-7DDH6Y?Open
Document (stressing the importance of increasing security to facilitate
humanitarian aid to Iraqis who lack essential goods and services).
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killed there. 106 When U.N. Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes visited the area in April 2008, he
did not go into Iraq for security reasons. At the same time,
international agencies have begun to expand their staff on the
ground. 107 It is hoped they will find that direct cooperation with local
leaders, local communities, and local NGOs will prove an important
way of increasing assistance and protection for IDPs and reinforcing
local capacity.

B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Several solutions have been proposed to help Iraq deal with the
IDP problem. These include creating camps or safe havens, carrying
out population transfers, introducing property and compensation
mechanisms, establishing a viable political system, and
implementing the National Policy to Address Displacement.
1. Camps or Safe Havens
A solution put forward during the height of the sectarian violence
was the creation of large scale IDP camps or safe havens to enhance
access to the displaced, take the strain off host families and contain
refugee flows. 108 Camps, it was argued, could provide public services
106. See HANSEN, supra note 98, at 7 (recognizing that such deaths occurred
despite a range of security strategies employed to protect aid workers).
107. See Tim Cocks, Foreign Aid Workers Start to Return Home, REUTERS, July
31, 2008 (reporting that the World Health Organization “quietly redeployed
expatriate workers to Iraq” in July 2008); Guterres Visits Iraq; Announces
Strengthened UNHCR Presence, UNHCR, July 5, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id=47b99cd54 (citing Guterres’s February 2008
promise to boost UNHCR’s “Baghdad-based staff from two to five
internationals”); Iraq: Q&A – A day in the Life of Our Man in Baghdad, UNHCR,
July 4, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id=
486e36fc4 (detailing the routine of UNHCR’s Iraq representative in Baghdad);
Press Release, United Nations Security Council, United Nations “Doing its Best”
in Iraq in Midst of Painful National Transition, Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs Tells Security Council (Apr. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9311.doc.htm (noting that overall UN
staff—non-humanitarian and humanitarian—has increased in Baghdad’s Green
Zone and Erbil to nearly 200 people).
108. See BYMAN & POLLACK, supra note 12, at 44-45 (presenting the
establishment of safe havens or “catch basins” along the Iraqi border as a way to
“prevent the flow of dangerous people” across the border).
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to the displaced and a modicum of security. But many compelling
reasons dictated against setting up camps and would do so in the
future. Camps or safe havens in today’s Iraq could easily be taken
over by one ethnic group or another and become targets of sectarian
attack. Moreover, unless the camps became detention centers
surrounded by troops or police, it would be difficult to protect the
people inside. There is also the question of whose troops or police
would do the protecting. The reliability of the army and the police in
Iraq remains questionable, as there have been clear connections
between these officers and the militias undertaking the sectarian
cleansing. Camps could also become an easy source of recruitment
for militias while their restrictions on human rights and freedom of
movement would undermine IDP protection. Iraqis, moreover,
strongly prefer to stay with extended families and friends, and only a
small percentage inhabit camps. For these reasons, the
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Human Rights
of IDPs, Walter Kälin, called for camps to be used in Iraq as “a last
resort.” 109 He recommended alternative measures such as providing
resources to families to allow them to construct additional rooms in
their homes for the displaced or supporting communities to enable
them to build housing for the displaced and expand public services
for them. 110
Special safe areas for Iraqi Christians have also been proposed.
However, the recent attacks that have taken place against them have
been within the area where Christians predominantly live (Ninveh
province) and to where they fled to escape attacks in other parts of
the country. It has further been suggested that a Christian semiautonomous province become part of the Kurdish region where
Christians would presumably be better protected, but this could risk
their becoming caught up in a conflict over territory between the
Kurds and the Arab central government. Clearly needed is

109. See Walter Kälin, A Tragedy of Increasing Proportions: Internal
Displacement in Iraq, FORCED MIGRATION REV., June 2007, at 15 (noting the
shortcomings of refugee camps, including expense, risk of increased sectarian
violence, and inadequacy in upholding cultural traditions).
110. See id. (advocating allowing IDPs to live within existing communities in
order to avoid the dangers associated with IDP camps).

COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

1/22/2009 6:03:45 PM

IRAQ’S DISPLACED

331

responsible governmental protection of Christians and other
minorities. 111
2. Population Transfers.
Another solution put forward at the height of the violence was
organized population transfers so that Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds, with
the help of the international community, could relocate, albeit
voluntarily, to areas of the country where their ethnic group was in
the majority. The population transfers were intended to accompany
“a soft partition” of the country into Kurdish, Shi’a and Sunni
areas. 112 Not surprisingly, this solution proved distasteful to many
because it put the international community in the position of
facilitating ethnic cleansing and of promoting mass displacement.
Historically, population transfers were viewed in a positive light as
a means of lessening loss of life in communal conflicts, creating
more cohesive societies, and promoting more stable border
demarcations. Such exchanges were carried out after the first and
second world wars and also on the Indian subcontinent in the late
1940s. But as human rights expert Felice Gaer has noted, “[t]hese
mass population exchanges came with tremendous costs.”113 Millions
111. Erica Goode & Suadad Al-Salhy, A Spate of Violence in Mosul Forces
Iraqi Christians to Flee Their Former Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A10.
112. Compare EDWARD P. JOSEPH & MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, BROOKINGS
INST., THE CASE FOR SOFT PARTITION IN IRAQ 3 (2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq_joseph/06iraq_jose
ph.pdf (suggesting that “the mass movement of populations is far preferable to
insisting that people at risk stay put or return to their homes to prop up an illusion
of political co-existence”), with Chaim Kaufmann, Separating Iraqis, Saving Iraq,
85 FOREIGN AFF. 4, July/Aug. 2006, at 156-60 (arguing that any partition would
only be “de facto, because many Shiite leaders still hope that a unified country can
emerge, and no regime in the Middle East would tolerate” Kurdish independence).
113. See Internal Memorandum by Felice Gaer of the Jacob Blaustein Institute
for the Advancement of Human Rights, Resolving Conflicts and Upholding
Human Rights Principles: Population Exchanges (Feb. 15, 2007) (on file with
author); see also Rama Lakshmi, India’s Survivors of Partition Begin to Break
Long Silence, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008, at A1 (noting that “[a]ccording to
conservative estimates, about half a million Hindus and Muslims were slaughtered
and 14 million displaced, and about 70,000 women were abducted and raped,
leaving both countries with deep psychological and political scars”). Kenneth Hill
et al. compiled an excellent study of the impact of partition. See generally Kenneth
Hill et al., The Demographic Impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947, 62
POPULATION STUDIES 2 (2008) (concluding that “Partition-related population
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of people were uprooted and persons became “dispossessed, and sent
penniless and homeless on what, for many, were death
marches.” 114 Although billed as voluntary, they were not in fact
because “[t]here was no individual buy-in, or consent, to the
exchanges, and little in the way of compensation or restitution of
property.” 115
In the case of Iraq, population exchanges could easily turn into
coerced actions, with transfers possibly leading to unemployment,
homelessness, poverty, and vulnerability to violence. Nor would they
be easy to accomplish in Iraq since thirty-five percent of marriages,
at least in the past, were mixed and people of different ethnic and
religious backgrounds were used to living and working together.
Advocates of the idea have argued that population transfers, however
painful, might be the only way to protect people from sectarian
violence; moreover, if people asked to be relocated for protection,
they should be helped. 116 Others have countered that population
transfers overlook the right of IDPs to return to their homes once the
threat to their safety has ended. In fact, there is a growing
international consensus that displaced people should have the option
not only of resettlement but of return to reclaim their property and
even their homes. Population transfers would remove this choice. 117
In deciding the future status of Kirkuk, however, population
transfers could become a part of the solution. 118 The liabilities of the

losses in the Punjab, either from deaths or unrecorded migration, were in the range
of 2.3-3.2 million”).
114. See DAVID FROMKIN, KOSOVO CROSSING, 189-90 (Free Press 1999)
(chronicling the population deportations in Eastern and Central Europe after World
War II).
115. Gaer, supra note 113.
116. Samantha Power, Op-Ed, Beating Genocide in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2007, at A15 (“If Iraqis tell us that they would feel safer in religiously
homogenous neighborhoods . . . we should support and protect them in their
voluntary, peaceful evacuation.”).
117. Cf. RHODRI C. WILLIAMS, BROOKINGS INST., APPLYING THE LESSONS OF
BOSNIA IN IRAQ: WHATEVER THE SOLUTION, PROPERTY RIGHTS SHOULD BE
SECURED (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0108_
iraq_williams.aspx (relating one of Bosnia’s most important legacies, the general
rule that “all those wrongfully displaced during the war had the right to return and
reclaim their former homes and property,” to Iraq).
118. See Stephen Farrell, U.N. Readies ‘Grand Deal’ to Resolve Iraq’s Dispute
over Kirkuk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at A10 (noting that UN officials left open
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approach should therefore be carefully studied so that steps will be
taken to mitigate the negative effects.
3. Property and Compensation Mechanisms.
To encourage the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes as
well as enhance their ability to resettle elsewhere, it is crucial that
effective property restitution or compensation mechanisms be
established for those forced from their homes since 2003.
For Iraqis who lost their land and property as a result of the
policies of Saddam Hussein, mechanisms were created in
cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority. 119 These
procedures need to be extended to those more recently displaced and
improvements made in how they work. The processing of claims for
the victims of Saddam Hussein has taken far too long. By the end of
2007, the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes
was able to decide only one-fourth of the claims submitted (some
37,000 out of 135,000). 120 There was also a low rate of enforcement.
Other problems arose as well—people with informal or collective
land claims (such as the Marsh Arabs) found little or no help in
retrieving property; there was little legal clarity over whether
damages to property were covered; and the requirement of formal
documentation to prove ownership excluded too many claims,
pointing to the need for more flexible interpretations and applications
of the law. 121

the possibility that population transfers may be recommended for Kirkuk, although
noting that such a move would be contentious in the region).
119. See Peter Van der Auweraert, Presentation at U.S. Dep’t of State
Symposium on Post Conflict Restitution in Arlington, Virginia (Sept. 6-7, 2007),
available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(http
Documents)/48FF3C144E17CBBCC12573DB00500C96/$file/Property+Restitutio
n+in+Iraq+-+Peter+Van+der+Auweraert.pdf (examining the background and
establishment of the CRRPD to address the property violations that occurred under
Saddam’s regime).
120. Id.
121. See id. (noting the necessity for reconsideration of thousands of decisions
after changes to the CRRPD law and that “a significant number of successful
claimants face difficulties in having their CRRPD restitution decisions enforced”);
see also Norbert Wuehler, Presentation at Conference on Internally Displaced
Persons – An Ongoing Dialogue, The Amar International Charitable Foundation,
London (Mar. 1-2, 2006).
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Property specialist Rhodri Williams, who worked on claims in
Bosnia for the U.N., recommends that the Iraqi authorities make an
announcement that the appropriation and destruction of property
since 2003 will be reversed through the use of legal remedies. Iraq,
he says, should stand behind the provisions in its Civil Code, which
specify that “true title does not pass with property acquired
unlawfully; that transfers of property made under duress are invalid;
and that those wrongfully dispossessed are entitled to the return of
their property as well as compensation . . . .” 122 Williams warns that
the absence of a meaningful legal process of restitution in which
hundreds of thousands are dispossessed could threaten long-term
national and regional stability. 123
In Bosnia, he notes, by 2004, families were able to reclaim
approximately 200,000 abandoned homes, and as many as half of
those displaced have returned to their former homes. 124 At the same
time, the Balkans experience shows that many refugees and IDPs do
not return to their home areas unless their ethnic group is in the
majority. 125 Similarly, in Iraq, many of the refugees and IDPs may
not return home, but being able to resolve their property claims may
at least enable them to earn the means for reintegration elsewhere in
the country. International organizations should be tapped to help set
up such mechanisms in Iraq, in particular the “independent and
impartial commission” called for in the government’s new National
Policy on Displacement. 126 The international community’s long
experience with property claims and the lack of capacity and
frequent politicizing of state institutions in Iraq make this essential.
122. Williams, supra note 117; see, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 135 (1951)
(Iraq) (invalidating the disposal of property without the validation of the rightful
owner); id. art. 114 (providing that contracts made under duress are void); id. art
192 (requiring that usurped property be returned to its owner).
123. See Williams, supra note 117 (explaining that the “legacy of grievance and
impoverishment” resulting from a lack of legal restitution remedies may pose a
great “threat to long-term national and regional stability”).
124. Id. (underscoring that the reclaiming of property allowed refugees and IDPs
to “get on with their post-war lives” by giving them economic autonomy).
125. See Deniz Sert, Property Rights in IDP Return and Resettlement (Feb.
2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York Graduate
Center) (on file with author).
126. See Ministry Press Release, supra note 100 (announcing the participation
of the United Nations and the international community in the new Iraqi National
Policy to Address Displacement).
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4. A Viable Political System.
The way Iraq evolves politically will heavily affect how
displacement is addressed. The Bush Administration has by and large
supported a unitary state as the best way of preventing Iraq from
falling into chaos. The Shi’a led al-Maliki government, it believes,
will ultimately transform itself into one of national unity. 127 Others,
however, argue that the only way to preserve a unified Iraq is by the
development of a “loose federalism.” Vice-President-elect Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., when chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
called for a decentralized, federal state as the best political solution
for Iraq. 128 Author Peter Galbraith has gone further, arguing in favor
of partition and pointing out that a loose confederation has already
become “the reality on the ground.” 129 The existence of an
autonomous Kurdish north, a Shi’a region in the south, a Sunni
enclave in the center and west, with a weak national government in
Baghdad constitutes a form of partition, which Galbraith considers “a
better outcome than a Sunni-Shiite civil war.” 130 Such a war would
lead to a Shi’a victory given the preponderance of Shi’a in the
country and the strong potential influence of Iran. What is needed
instead, Galbraith argues, is a blueprint for working out the borders
of the three ethnic areas, an arrangement for the sharing of oil
revenues, and a formula to share or divide Baghdad. Opponents of
partition, however, consider the reality on the ground more complex.
127. Compare Peter W. Galbraith, The Surge, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 15,
2007, at 4 [hereinafter Galbraith, The Surge] (recognizing that “Bush’s strategy
assumes that Iraq’s Shiite-led government can become a force for national unity”),
with Charles Krauthammer, The Partitioning of Iraq, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2007,
at A21 (arguing a weak partioned Iraq is not the best outcome and that it is “highly
doubtful” that “[a] democratic, unified Iraq might someday emerge” through
“ground-up reconciliation in the provinces”).
128. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed., Federalism, Not
Partition, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2007, at A23 (“[Our plan] would hold Iraq together
by bringing to life the federal system enshrined in its constitution. A federal Iraq is
a united Iraq but one in which power devolves to regional governments, with a
limited central government”).
129. See Peter W. Galbraith, Op-Ed, Make Walls, Not War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2007, at A29 (contending that the plan advocated by Biden/Brownback “is
irrevocably becoming the reality on the ground” in Iraq).
130. See id. (“Let’s face it: partition is a better outcome than a Sunni-Shiite civil
war.”). See generally Galbraith, The Surge, supra note 127 (outlining the dangers
attendant in an un-partitioned Iraq).

COHEN_TO PRINT.DOC

336

1/22/2009 6:03:45 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:301

They point out that local militia leaders and sheiks have begun to
control areas with shifting boundaries in which “Shi’a are often at
odds with other Shi’a and Sunni at odds with other Sunni.” 131 Any
move to partition the country into three parts, these experts contend,
will not only have little bearing on what now exists but will meet
with substantial resistance.
As of this writing, the Shi’a dominated government has been
consolidating its strength over the center and south of the country.
But whatever political system emerges, it should be in the interest of
both the central and local authorities to initiate and carry forward
programs to address the needs of internally displaced populations.
Reintegrating IDPs is not only a humanitarian imperative but a
strategic one. Large masses of people without the basic necessities of
life are a threat to national as well as local security.
5. Implementation of the National Policy to Address Displacement.
Launched in July 2008, the policy sets forth the rights of the
displaced and the government’s obligations toward these
populations. It promises to ensure that IDPs are registered, can
readily access basic services, obtain documentation, secure
compensation for lost or damaged property, find employment and
housing, receive pensions, and obtain assistance and legal aid when
subject to human rights abuse. 132 To promote its implementation, it
will need to be reinforced by:
• A comprehensive database to provide information about the
needs of the displaced in all governorates, updated by regular
countrywide assessments.
• The setting up of consultation mechanisms to achieve a close
working relationship with IDPs, local communities and NGOs
in applying the policy.

131. See Thom Shanker, Op-Ed., Divided They Stand, But On Graves, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, WK1 (quoting a deputy director at the International Crisis
group warning “that Iraq ‘was not falling apart into two or three parts; the country
risks total collapse’”).
132. See Ministry Press Release, supra note 100 (outlining the “need for
coordination and cooperation between the different Ministries and the international
community”).
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• The active involvement and coordination of all relevant central
and local government offices (e.g., displacement and migration,
housing, health, education, finance, human rights and the
judicial system) in implementing the policy and carrying out its
recommendations.
• The assignment to government offices of staff in sufficient
numbers and with adequate training to carry out the policy and
apply the principle of non-discrimination in so doing.
• The training of police and military to protect displaced persons
and humanitarian staff and hold accountable those involved in
sectarian violence, forced displacement, the destruction of
houses, the expropriation of land, and attacks on aid workers
and their supplies.
• The allocation of adequate resources, in particular a fixed
percentage of oil revenues, to address the needs of the
displaced. 133 The Iraqi Parliament has urged the government to
allocate $1.5 billion for this purpose, and a parliamentary
committee has recommended $4 billion. 134 A substantial part of
the funds should be given directly to displaced families, and
resources should also be assigned to governorates, local
communities and families hosting the displaced. Local NGOs
should also be apportioned funds to build up their capacity in
helping IDPs.
• The setting up, in collaboration with the U.N., of property
restitution and compensation mechanisms for those uprooted
since 2003, with special attention paid to Kirkuk where
property claims are becoming explosive and where mechanisms
instituted now could prevent violence and more displacement
133. See Parliament Committee Demands Fixed Budget, supra note 28 (quoting
the Iraqi Parliament’s Displacement and Migration Committee’s proposal that “3
to 5 percent of national oil revenues should be allocated” for assistance to refugees
and IDPs).
134. See Parliament Urges Government to Reallocate Development Money to
Those in Need, IRIN, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?
ReportId=77740 (quoting the head of the Iraqi Parliament’s anti-corruption
committee, advocating that the money “belongs to the Iraqi people and it must go
to the Iraqi people”); and Iraq: Parliament demands financial help for IDPs,
refugees, IRIN, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId
=80581.
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later on. In addition, there should be more rigorous application
of existing compensation laws applicable to claims prior to
2003.
• Evaluations of conditions for return throughout the country,
and the setting up of special programs to help IDPs and
refugees return or resettle once conditions are deemed safe and
sustainable. Dialogue and reconciliation programs should be
introduced in return areas, such as the joint rebuilding of
houses and infrastructure by different ethnic and religious
groups, and the strengthening of the judicial system to deal
with issues of justice, reconciliation and human rights.

CONCLUSION
Absent a political accommodation among Shi’a, Sunnis and
Kurds, the return and reintegration of most of Iraq’s displaced will be
difficult to achieve. Although some steps have been taken on the
political front, 135 progress has been limited on the major issues—the
sharing of oil revenues; the development of an effective national
police able to deal with sectarian and tribal violence (there appears to
be progress with respect to the army); the disbanding of local
militias; the implementation of a more decentralized form of
government; and a decision on the future status of Kirkuk. Without
movement on these issues, large scale violence could potentially
resume in different parts of the country with substantial deaths and
the increased displacement of people.
One clear test of whether Iraq will emerge as a functioning state is
how it addresses the needs of the more than four million persons
displaced inside the country and throughout the region. Government
135. See, e.g., Jason Gluck, From Gridlock to Compromise: How Three Laws
Could Begin to Transform Iraqi Politics, United States Institute for Peace Briefing,
May 2008, http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0319_iraqi_politics
.html (recognizing the importance of the amnesty law that would benefit Sunnis
and a law aimed at better structuring the relationship between the central and
provincial governments, including a compromise that grants seventeen percent of
national revenues to the Kurdish regional government); ERIC OWLES, PODCAST:
THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION LAW (N.Y. Times 2008), http://baghdadbureau.blogs.
nytimes.com/2008/09/26/podcast-the-provincial-election-law/?hp (recognizing the
impact of the provincial election law on increasing the representation of Sunnis in
government).
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action too often has been marred by sectarian preferences, a lack of
urgency, and incompetence. The International Medical Corps has
called for a “civilian surge” to develop the technical capacity and
efficiency of the Iraqi government to deal with the humanitarian
emergency. 136 The urgency felt by the displaced and their supporters
was expressed by the chair of an Iraqi coalition of NGOs who called
upon the government “to shoulder the majority of the responsibility”
for Iraq’s IDPs and refugees. 137 The government’s new National
Policy to Address Displacement, a welcome development,
constitutes an important framework for addressing the needs of the
displaced but it will require a great deal of national and international
effort to implement its provisions, reinforced by greater portions of
Iraq’s growing oil revenues. To date, the government has set aside
only meager amounts of its $70 billion budget for 2008 for refugees
and IDPs. 138 Unless it is willing to tackle the humanitarian crisis
inside the country and the refugee crisis and brain drain that it has
caused, Iraq will not be able to work out effective responses to the
larger issues of its internal stability and political future.
The United States must fully acknowledge the special obligation it
has toward Iraq’s displaced, since its actions have spawned the
overall crisis in Iraq. Assuming this responsibility will mean working
with the government of Iraq to support its development of programs
for the safe and sustainable returns of most refugees and IDPs. It will
also mean sharp increases in its own financial support for refugees
and IDPs as well as a willingness to bring into the United States
larger numbers of Iraqis and to mobilize a more generous
international response. America will also have to pay greater
attention to how security will be provided for civilians once the
United States draws down its troop levels. It remains unclear how
136. See Concerned Over Crisis – International Medical Corps Calls for LongTerm Assistance to Iraqis, INT’L MEDICAL CORPS, Apr. 14, 2008,
http://www.imcworldwide.org/content/article/detail/1734/ (bemoaning a gap in the
delivery of services that humanitarian aid workers could fill).
137. See More Government Money, supra note 28.
138. Compare Iraq: Government Incentives for IDPs, Refugees to Return, IRIN,
June 3, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78532 (reporting
that “the Iraqi government has allotted . . . $195 million to encourage [IDPs] and
refugees to return to their homes), with Vote Brings Iraqi Budget to Record $70
Billion, CNN.COM, July 8, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/08/
iraq.main/index.html (noting that Iraq’s total 2008 budget is now $70 billion).
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effectively Iraqi national police and army will be able to provide
security for IDPs and returning refugees and contain radical militias
should they resume propagating sectarian violence. This makes the
option of an international or regional police force worth considering.
U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. while dying in the rubble of
the Canal Hotel bombing in 2003, urged that the United Nations not
leave Iraq. It is time for the world community to heed his appeal and
play a more engaged role in the reconstruction and development of
Iraq, the return and reintegration of its displaced populations and its
movement toward a more politically sound future.

